State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from March 27, 1996 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
3-27-1996 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from March 27, 1996 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from March 27, 
1996 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/478 
^ STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM J. BROEDEL, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17331 
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
-and-
STATE OP NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW YORK), 
Employer. 
) WILLIAM J. BROEDEL, Pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by William Broedel 
to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing his charge that the Security 
and Law Enforcement Employees, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Council 82) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees7 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it refused his request to seek vacatur 
of a supplemental award of an arbitrator interpreting an earlier 
consent arbitration award. The Director notified Broedel that 
his charge was deficient. Broedel then filed an amendment to the 
charge. Finding that the charge remained deficient, the Director 
i y
 dismissed it as not setting forth facts sufficient to support a 
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finding that Council 82's decision not to seek to vacate the 
arbitration award was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
He further found that Broedel was without standing to file the 
charge because he was retired when he made the demand upon 
Council 82 and that certain allegations in his amendment were 
untimely. 
Broedel's exceptions simply repeat the allegations set forth 
in his charge and amendment. 
After a review of the record and a consideration of 
Broedel's arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
In 1993, Broedel was served with notices of discipline by 
the State of New York (State University of New York) (State), 
which sought his termination. Pursuant to an agreement reached 
by Council 82 and the State, Broedel agreed to retire from State 
employment and withdraw certain complaints he had filed against 
the State. The State withdrew the notices of discipline and 
agreed to pay Broedel one and a half times his annual salary, in 
two lump sum payments. This agreement was confirmed in a consent 
award issued by an arbitrator, who retained jurisdiction to 
ensure compliance with his order. Broedel alleges that the 
agreement was that the payments to him were to be "tax free". 
When he subsequently faced tax liability for some or all of the 
payments, he requested Council 82's assistance. Pursuant to 
Council 82's inquiries on Broedel's behalf, the arbitrator issued 
a supplemental award, finding that the original award, which he 
had drafted, had not contemplated a "tax free" payment and that, 
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in any event, he had no authority to resolve issues of Broedel's 
tax liability. Thereafter, Broedel requested that Council 82 
seek to have the supplemental award vacated as being fraudulent 
and exceeding the arbitrator's authority. Council 82 declined to 
do so, advising Broedel that it considered the award to be final 
and binding. 
Even assuming that Council 82 is under a duty of fair 
representation to Broedel,-7 nothing in the charge as filed or 
amended evidences that Council 82's decision denying Broedel's 
request to seek to vacate the arbitrator's award was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. His request was reviewed by 
Council 82, he was timely advised of its reasons for denying his 
request and he has provided no facts which would evidence that 
Council 82 breached its duty of fair representation in reaching 
its decision. 
To the extent that Broedel alleges in his amendment that 
Council 82 failed to adequately represent him in the disciplinary 
proceedings which led to the consent award, we affirm the 
Director's determination that the conduct to which that 
-
7The Director held that Council 82 owed no duty of fair 
representation to Broedel because, at all times relevant to the 
charge, Broedel was not a public employee within the meaning of 
the Act, having earlier severed his employment relationship with 
the State. Therefore, the Director found there was no violation 
of the Act as alleged because the statutory duty of fair 
representation runs only from an employee organization to the 
public employees it represents. Because of our finding herein, 
we need not reach this issue. 
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allegation relates occurred more than four months prior to the 
filing of the charge and is, therefore, untimely. 
For the reasons set forth above, Broedel's exceptions are 
denied and the decision of the Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
JuL. %1 \£Sdl V - ^ t - . 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member 
'"") STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DANIEL THOMAS FRONCZAK, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15023 
NEW YORK STATE SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Employer. 
In the Matter of 
DANIEL THOMAS FRONCZAK, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15027 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
DANIEL THOMAS FRONCZAK, pro se 
CHRISTOPHER H. GARDNER, ESQ., for Respondent New York State 
Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Council 82 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD MCDOWELL Of 
counsel), for Employer/Respondent State of New York 
Department of Correctional Services 
J 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by Daniel Thomas 
Fronczak to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing, pursuant to motion, his improper practice charges 
alleging that the New York State Security and Law Enforcement 
Employees, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82) violated 
§209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it failed to file grievances on his behalf and 
that the State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) 
(State) violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (d) of the Act when it 
discriminated against him for having filed grievances. At the 
close of the first day of hearing, at which Fronczak was 
represented by counsel, the ALJ adjourned the hearing sine die 
and requested an offer of proof from Fronczak as to what other 
evidence he would introduce in support of his claim that 
Council 82 had failed to process his grievances and that the 
State had retaliated against him for filing grievances. The 
offer of proof was requested because the evidence he had 
submitted did not support any violation of the Act and actually 
tended to exculpate both Council 82 and the State. After the 
offer of proof was submitted, both Council 82 and the State made 
motions to dismiss the charges. The ALJ, after a review of the 
transcript, the offer of proof, and the parties7 briefs on the 
motion, granted the motions and dismissed both charges in their 
entirety. 
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Fronczak, appearing now pro se, reiterates in his exceptions 
the allegations made against Council 82 and the State in his 
improper practice charges. He claims that he has established the 
violations alleged and requests that the hearing be reopened. He 
also seeks to introduce new exhibits.-1 The State, in its c 
response to Fronczak7s exceptions, claims that they are untimely 
and it otherwise supports the ALT7s decision. Council 82 has not 
filed a response to the exceptions. 
After a review of the record and the parties7 arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the ALT. 
Initially, we note that Fronczak7s exceptions were filed 
within the time period required by the Rules of Procedure-7 and 
Fronczak has provided proof that he also served the State and 
Council 82 within the required time. We, therefore, find the 
exceptions to have been timely filed. 
Fronczak alleges that because he filed grievances 
complaining about safety on the job, he received a worse 
performance evaluation from the State than he had previously 
received, that the State had him psychologically and physically 
examined and, when he was found as a result of.those examinations 
-'We have not considered the additional exhibits submitted by 
Fronczak with his exceptions because they were not part of the 
record before the ALJ. 
-
7PERB7s Rules of Procedure, §204.10, require that exceptions to 
a decision of an ALJ be filed with PERB, with proof of service on 
the other parties, within 15 working days of receipt of the 
decision. 
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to be unable to perform the essential functions of his position, 
placed him on involuntary leave of absence and, after a Civil 
Service Law (CSL) §72 hearing, terminated him. Council 82, he 
asserts, failed to file a grievance for him complaining of this 
retaliation by the State and, as a result, he was disadvantaged 
at his CSL §72 hearing,3/ where he attempted to show that the 
finding that he was unable to perform his duties was made in 
retaliation for the filing of his first safety grievance. 
There were four witnesses called by Fronczak to testify at . 
the hearing. Craig Downing, the local president of Council 82 at 
the Wyoming Correctional Facility (Wyoming), where Fronczak 
served as a correction officer, testified that all grievances 
that he had received from Fronczak were processed according to 
the appropriate grievance procedures, including disciplinary, 
safety and evaluation grievances. He further testified that the 
grievance about which Fronczak complained, which was dated 
March 16, 1993, was never received from Fronczak and that he was 
unaware of it until October 1993, when he received a copy of it 
in a packet of information from Council 82's office of counsel. 
At that time, the grievance was untimely and, in any event, the 
issues raised in it had already been addressed in prior 
grievances. Crediting Downing's testimony and the evidence 
submitted by Fronczak detailing the handling of his numerous 
-
7Fronczak declined Council 82's offer to represent him at the 
CSL §72 hearing. 
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other grievances by Council 82, and finding that the offer of 
proof yielded no facts, which if proven, would establish a 
violation of the Act, the ALJ determined that Council 82 had not 
violated §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act by failing to process 
Fronczak's March 16, 1993 grievance.-/ 
As to the State, Fronczak offered no evidence in support of 
his allegations that the State acted out of anti-union animus and 
in retaliation for his filing of the safety grievances. The 
other witnesses Fronczak called to testify were his supervisor at 
Wyoming and two employees who had worked with him in Wyoming's 
infirmary. The ALJ found nothing in their testimony to even 
suggest anti-union animus on the part of the State. She also 
found that Fronczak's offer of proof likewise offered only 
conclusions without any facts in support of his allegations 
against the State. As a result, she dismissed the §2 09-a.l(a) 
and (b) allegations against the State.-7 
Our review of the record and Fronczak's exceptions provides 
no basis to reverse the ALJ. Given the evidence Fronczak 
introduced at the first day of hearing, the ALJ properly 
exercised her discretion in requiring an offer of proof from him 
-'As the duty to bargain occurs only between a public employer 
and the certified or recognized employee organization, Fronczak 
has no standing to allege a violation of §209-a.2 (b) of the Act 
and his charge in that regard was, therefore, properly dismissed. 
-''Fronczak also has no standing to allege a violation of 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act because a violation of the duty to bargain 
in good faith may only be raised by the certified or recognized 
bargaining agent and his charge in that regard was properly 
dismissed. 
Board - U-15023 & U-15027 -6 
before proceeding further.-7 Having given Fronczak all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence he introduced 
and his offer of proof,-7 the ALJ correctly concluded that 
Fronczak failed to prove, and failed to allege any facts upon 
which it could be proven, that either Council 82 or the State 
violated the Act by their actions towards him. 
Based on the foregoing, therefore, we deny Fronczak's 
exceptions and affirm the ALJ's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
I £&s Pauline R. Klnsella, Chairperson 
Eric J* Schmertz, Member 7 
-
7Nanuet Union Free Sch. Dist. and Nanuet Teachers Ass'n, 17 PERB 
H3005 (1984). 
?7Countv of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB 53 013 (1984). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, RENSSELAER 
COUNTY LOCAL 842, CITY OF TROY UNIT 8251, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-167 07 
CITY OF TROY, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JANNA PFLU6ER of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
PETER KEHOE, CORPORATION COUNSEL (BRYAN J. GOLDBERGER 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Troy (City) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) on a charge filed by the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Rensselaer County Local 842, City of Troy Unit 8251 
(CSEA). After a hearing, the Director held that the City 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees7 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when its City Manager and other agents 
engaged in a general campaign of harassment against CSEA, its 
officers and members, which included disciplinary actions, actual 
and,threatened changes in long-standing employment practices, 
changes in employees' work locations and a change in one 
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employee's hours of work.-7 The Director concluded that all of 
these actions were taken for the purpose of interfering with, 
restraining, coercing or discriminating against employees for the 
exercise of various rights protected by the Act. 
The City argues that the Director's decision is not 
supported by the record. It asserts that there is no proof that 
the actions in issue were taken in retaliation for the employees' 
exercise of statutorily protected rights. Rather, the City 
argues that the Director should have concluded on the record 
before him that the City acted in all respects for legitimate 
business reasons and consistently with its rights under the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement. CSEA argues that the 
Director's decision is plainly correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's decision. 
The City called no witnesses. The testimony from CSEA's 
several witnesses was unrebutted and the Director credited that 
testimony. The record affords us no basis upon which to 
question, much less set aside, those credibility resolutions. As 
-'Having found and remedied the violations of §209-a.l(a) and (c) 
of the Act, the Director did not decide the alleged violation of 
§209-a.l(d). No exceptions have been taken to the Director's 
declination to reach the alleged violation of §2 09-a.l(d) of the 
Act. In addition, the City has withdrawn that part of its 
exceptions pertaining to the Director's order regarding parking 
privileges for unit employees. The parties have notified us that 
they voluntarily settled that issue after release of the 
Director's decision. Therefore, although we affirm the 
Director's decision, we have not included any order pertaining to 
the employees' parking privileges. 
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more fully explained in the Director's decision, the record 
contains persuasive direct and circumstantial evidence of the 
City's improper motivation. The City's actions, the statements 
made by its agents, and the timing of those actions, all wholly 
unexplained and contrary to the City's long-standing labor and 
employment practices, lead inexorably to the conclusion reached 
by the Director. As the City's actions were improperly 
motivated, any question as to whether any of its actions were 
within the scope of its contract rights is immaterial in this 
proceeding because a party may not exercise a right for a reason 
unlawful under the Act. Finding the Director's decision to be 
fully supported by the record, we affirm his decision for the 
reasons set forth therein. The City's exceptions are, 
accordingly, denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City immediately: 
1. Rescind the notices of discipline issued to Janet M. 
Wisher on March 17 and 24, 1995, the notice of 
discipline issued to Joan Murray on March 17, 1995, and 
the notice of discipline issued to Robert Bloodgood on 
April 13, 1995. 
2. Restore William G. Kelton to his 6:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. 
shift. 
3. Restore Janet M. Wisher and Joan Murray to their work 
assignments in the Finance Department as those 
assignments existed prior to April 10, 1995. 
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4. Rescind and cease enforcement or implementation of the 
City's letter to CSEA dated March 23, 1995. 
5. Rescind any orders prohibiting the conduct of all union 
business by employees while on City time and restore 
the practice in that regard as it existed prior to the 
prohibition. 
6. Rescind the order to Finance Department employees 
prohibiting all nonbusiness communication during 
working hours between and among such employees and 
restore the practice in that regard as it existed prior 
to the prohibition. 
7. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations used 
to post notices of information to employees in CSEA's 
unit. 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Troy (City) in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Rensselaer County Local 842, City of Troy Unit 8251 (CSEA) that the City of Troy will 
immediately: 
1. Rescind the notices of discipline issued to Janet M. Wisher on March 17 and 24,1995, the notice of discipline 
issued to Joan Murray on March 17, 1995, and the notice of discipline issued to Robert Bloodgood on 
April 13, 1995. 
2. Restore William G. Kelton to his 6:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. shift. 
3. Restore Janet M. Wisher and Joan Murray to their work assignments in the Finance Department as those 
) assignments existed prior to April 10, 1995. 
4. Rescind and cease enforcement or implementation of the City's letter to CSEA dated March 23, 1995. 
5. Rescind any orders prohibiting the conduct of all union business by employees while on City time and restore 
the practice in that regard as it existed prior to the prohibition. 
6. Rescind the order to Finance Department employees prohibiting all nonbusiness communication during 
working hours between and among such employees and restore the practice in that regard as it existed prior 
to the prohibition. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
CITY OF TROY 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, APSCME, APL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15953 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE & EISMAN (PETER A. BEE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing, after a hearing, its charge that the County of Nassau 
(County) violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public Employees7 
Fair Employment Act (Act)^ when, on July 18, 1994, and again on 
January 1, 1995, it unilaterally reduced shift differential pay 
for certain unit employees.-1 
-
7CSEA amended its charge at the beginning of the hearing to 
include the alleged violation of §209-a.l(e). 
-'CSEA had amended its original charge to add allegations of a 
violation by the County of §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act with 
respect to all civilian employees of the County's Police 
Department represented by CSEA and then to include the County's 
action on January 1, 1995, as to certain employees in the unit. 
The (a) and (c) allegations were withdrawn by CSEA at the start 
of the hearing. 
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CSEA represents civilian employees in the County's Police 
Department (Department). The employees are identified as being 
in one of four groups: Chart 7, Chart 12B, Fleet Services Bureau 
(Bureau) and Data Processing Department (Data Processing). 
The County and CSEA were parties to an agreement which was 
effective from January 1, 1990 through December 31, 1992. 
Article 26, §26-1, of that agreement provided, as here relevant, 
as follows: 
A County employee, at least one-half of whose shift is 
between 4:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. shall receive 
additional shift differential for each hour actually 
worked, regardless of whether such hours are between 
4:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. 
The agreement further provides, also at §2 6-1, the dollar amount 
of the differential for each year of the agreement. In order to 
calculate the number of hours for which employees would be paid 
pursuant to §26-1, the County instituted in the 1970's a practice 
of utilizing a baseline, or averaging system, for the payment of 
the contractual shift differential amounts to Chart 7 employees. 
In each biweekly paycheck, Chart 7 employees were paid a baseline 
of fifty units (or hours) biweekly. The total amount of shift 
differential for the year was adjusted on December 31 of each 
year to reflect an additional payment for shift differential of 
approximately one to six additional days, depending on how many 
shifts each employee had actually worked during the year* From 
1981, all Bureau and Data Processing employees were paid for a 
normal workweek, plus a shift differential based on a seventy-six 
hour baseline. When Chart 12B was created in February 1994, 
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three of those shifts were determined to qualify for the shift 
differential. A baseline of seventy-six hours per bi-weekly pay 
period was paid to qualifying Chart 12B employees. 
On July 18, 1994, the County issued Order 118-94, advising 
civilian employees of the Department that, effective July 22, 
1994, the shift differential baseline paid to Chart 7 employees 
would be reduced to forty-six units and the baseline for Chart 
12B employees would be reduced to seventy units. On August 1, 
1994, the parties ratified an agreement which extended and 
amended the expired agreement. The only alteration to §26-1 was 
to increase the dollar amount for each hour of shift differential 
for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996. Again, on January 5, 1995, 
the County reduced the baseline for Chart 7 employees to forty-
four units and for Chart 12B employees to sixty-eight units. 
The ALT dismissed the charge in its entirety, finding that 
the County had not violated §209-a.1(e) because it had not 
refused to continue the terms of an expired agreement. She found 
that because the County still adjusted each employee's salary at 
the end of the year to pay eligible employees for hours actually 
worked at the shift differential rate, its change in the 
baseline, used for calculating, on a biweekly basis, the shift 
differential hours, was not violative of §209-a.l(e) of the Act 
because the baselines were not terms of expired §2 6-1. As to the 
Data Processing employees, the ALT found that they were covered 
by §2 6-1 because their hours of work fell between 4:00 p.m. and 
8:00 a.m., as referenced therein. Therefore, as with the Chart 7 
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and Chart 12B employees, there had been no violation of 
§209-a.l(e) when the County reduced the number of hours in the 
baseline. 
Relying on an earlier decision by a different ALT,-7 the 
ALT found that the Bureau employees were not covered by §2 6-1 
and, therefore, there could not be any violation of §209-a.l(e) 
of the Act as to them. Moreover, she dismissed the charge as to 
the alleged §209-a.l(d) violation, finding that, although it had 
been established that the County had a practice of utilizing the 
baseline to calculate the shift differential for Bureau 
employees, the record did not establish that as to them there had 
been any change in the method of calculating or paying the shift 
differential. 
CSEA excepts only to the ALT's findings as to the Bureau and 
Data Processing employees, arguing that the record establishes 
that the noncontractual practice of paying both Bureau and Data 
Processing employees based on a baseline of seventy-six hours was 
changed by the County on July 18, 1994, in violation of 
§209-a.l(d); that the earlier decision relied upon by the ALT 
covered the Data Processing employees also; and that it had 
established an extra-contractual practice as to the Bureau and 
Data Processing employees. The County supports the ALT's decision. 
'^in County of Nassau, 24 PERB 54535 (1991) , the ALT found that 
Bureau employees, because of the hours of their shifts, were not 
covered by §26-1. As the issues involved and the parties were 
identical in this case, the ALT here determined that collateral 
estoppel applied. Accordingly, she rejected the County's 
argument that Bureau employees were covered by §2 6-1. 
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Based upon our consideration of the parties' arguments and a 
review of the record, we affirm the decision of the A U , although 
not for the reasons stated therein. 
The charge was amended by CSEA at the hearing to allege a 
violation of §209-a.l(e) as to all affected employees in the four 
departments. We affirm the ALJ's finding that there is no 
violation of (e) by the County's adjustment of the baseline. 
There is no dispute that the County is still paying a shift 
differential to unit employees for the actual number of eligible 
hours worked pursuant to that contractual language and, 
therefore, there is no failure to continue the terms of the 
expired agreement. 
The action complained of by CSEA which is not subject to 
§2 6-1, is the County's change in the practice of calculating the 
number of shift differential hours to be included in the bi-
weekly paycheck of each employee. When CSEA filed its original 
charge alleging a violation of §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act, the only 
employees alleged to have been affected by the County's action 
were Chart 7 and Chart 12B employees. No exceptions were filed 
concerning the Chart 7 and Chart 12B employees and the charge as 
to them is not properly before us. CSEA's amendment to allege 
violations of §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act, which referenced 
all bargaining unit members, was withdrawn at the hearing. As 
pointed out by the County in its response to CSEA's exceptions, 
the charge was not amended at any time to allege a violation of 
§2 09-a.l(d) as to the Data Processing and Bureau employees. 
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Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of the charge as to the Data 
Processing and Bureau employees, but on the basis that there is 
no (d) violation alleged as to them.-7 
Based on the foregoing, we deny CSEA's exceptions and affirm 
the ALJ's dismissal of the charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
c \<w Pauline R. "Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric CK Schmertz, Member 
-
7We may not consider allegations which are not raised in the 
charge or in timely amendments to the charge. Arlington Cent, 
Sch. Dist., 25 PERB f3001 (1992). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM A. FRISCH, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17183 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
WILLIAM A. FRISCH, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by William A. 
Frisch to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his improper 
practice charge against the New York State Public Employees 
Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF). The charge alleged that PEF violated 
§209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it refused to process his grievance to the arbitration step 
of the grievance procedure. Frisch was notified by the Director 
that his charge was deficient. In spite of a voluminous 
amendment filed in response to the deficiency letter, the 
Director found that the deficiencies remained uncorrected and 
dismissed the charge in its entirety. 
Frisch's exceptions basically restate the allegations in his 
charge and assert that the Director's decision is in error. 
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Based upon a review of the record and consideration of 
Frisch's arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
Frisch's charge was filed on October 10, 1995. The Director 
found that the only allegation contained in the charge or 
amendment which fell within four months of the filing of the 
charge^ was a July 12, 1995 letter to Frisch from the chair of 
PEF's Grievance Appeals Committee explaining why PEF was 
declining to take to arbitration Frisch's grievance seeking 
restoration of partial accruals used for a Workers' Compensation 
injury. As to that allegation, the Director found that Frisch 
had failed to provide any facts which might establish that PEF 
acted in an arbitrary, discriminatory or improperly motivated 
fashion in reaching its decision. As we have often held, an 
employee organization has no duty to process every grievance or 
to take every grievance to arbitration and is entitled to a broad 
range of discretion in determining which grievances it will 
pursue and to what level.-7 Here, PEF declined to process 
Frisch's grievance to arbitration and, in a timely fashion, it 
gave him a detailed written explanation of the reasons for its 
decision. While Frisch does not agree with PEF's position, he 
does not allege any facts in the charge, the amendment or the 
-^PERB's Rules of Procedure, §204.1(a) require that an improper 
practice charge be filed within four months of the act alleged to 
be improper. 
-
7See, e.g.f New York City Transit Auth. and Chapter 2, Civil 
Service Technical Guild, Local 375, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 22 PERB 
1[3028 (1989) . 
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exceptions which would support a conclusion that PEF was 
arbitrary, discriminatory or acting in bad faith when it reviewed 
his grievance. 
Based on the foregoing, Frisch's exceptions are denied and 
the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
V.-lie. J K-T-insella, Chairperson 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, APSCME, APL-CIO, CITY 
OP GLENS FALLS UNIT OF WARREN COUNTY 
LOCAL 857, 
Charging Party, 
-and- > CASE NO. U-16561 
CITY OP GLENS FALLS, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
BARTLETT, PONTIFF, STEWART & RHODES, P.C. (J. LAWRENCE 
PALTROWITZ of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
City of Glens Falls Unit of Warren County Local 857 (CSEA) to a 
decision by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director). After a hearing, the 
Assistant Director dismissed CSEA's charge against the City of 
Glens Falls (City) which alleges that the City violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when, in 1994, it required a Waste and Sewer Maintenance 
Mechanic-' to drive a dump truck from the water treatment plant 
-'The title was changed from Waste Water Plant Mechanic in 1991 
pursuant to a survey of positions conducted by the Municipal 
Services Division of the New York State Department of Civil 
Service. 
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to a landfill to dump by-products of the water treatment process 
and to have the driver's license appropriate under law for that 
task. 
The Assistant Director dismissed the charge because the 
reguirements were part of a job specification-'' issued pursuant 
to a Civil Service classification or reclassification, which is a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation.-7 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the City was reguired to 
negotiate the driving and licensing reguirements because the 
former is a task not even incidentally related to the employee's 
job and the latter is vague because it refers only to the 
"appropriate" license.-7 CSEA also excepts to the Assistant 
Director's observation in a footnote to his decision that the 
City had reserved by contract the right to reclassify positions. 
The City argues that the Assistant Director's decision is correct 
and should be affirmed. 
-
7A revised job specification was issued, apparently, in 1991 at 
the time the job title was changed. This specification lists 
under "typical work activities" the following: "operates various 
types of eguipment in connection with repair work; may operate a 
truck or other automotive equipment." It also carries as a 
"special requirement" the "possession of an appropriate level NYS 
driver's license . . . ." The former job specification did not 
contain those specific activities or the licensing requirement. 
The revised specification was not made known to the incumbent or 
to CSEA until the events in 1994 which gave rise to this charge. 
^Office of Court Admin., 12 PERB ^3075 (1979)(subsequent history 
omitted). 
-
7There is no dispute that the current incumbent had the license 
necessary for legal operation of the City's dump truck even, 
before the licensing reguirement was added to the job 
specification. 
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Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision under our 
decision in State of New York (State University of New York at 
Bincthamton)-7 (hereafter State of New York) , upon which all 
parties and the Assistant Director have relied, without reaching 
the classification question.-7 
In Waverly Central School District-7 (hereafter Waverly), 
it was held that job assignments which are either an essential 
aspect of an employee's basic employment function or in 
furtherance of tasks incidentally related thereto are 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation, wholly apart from any issue 
of civil service classification or reclassification. 
State of New York rests on Waverly. In State of New York, 
we held that the employer did not improperly refuse to negotiate 
when it required two employees to acquire a particular driver's 
license because their jobs reasonably required the operation of 
motor vehicles as an incident of their employment functions. The 
employer in that case was, however, required to negotiate the 
^
727 PERB 53018 (1994) . 
^The job specification is the specific basis for the City's duty 
assignment. The record, however, reveals little about the job 
specification beyond its written content. We do not know how the 
specification was prepared nor do we know whether it was issued 
by the State Department of Civil Service, by the local civil 
service commission or simply by an agent of the City as public 
employer. We, therefore, cannot conclude whether the addition of 
truck driving duties to the job specification occurred pursuant 
to classification. We accordingly do not adopt the Assistant 
Director's decision in this regard. 
I710 PERB J[3103 (1977) . 
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licensing directive as to one employee because that employee's 
job did not require the operation of a motor vehicle. 
The question in this case, as we have framed it for review, 
is whether operation of a dump truck, to the extent currently 
required by the City for the removal from the plant of the by-
products of water treatment, is inherently or incidentally part 
of the mechanic's job. If so, the City was under no statutory 
duty to negotiate either the driving or licensing requirement. 
CSEA is correct in its argument that the mechanic's job, 
before and after reclassification of that position, is one 
involving the application of acquired trade skills. Driving a 
dump truck cannot be considered an inherent part of the 
mechanic's job. However, neither can the occasional driving of 
such a vehicle for the limited purpose in issue in this case be a 
task which is not even incidentally related to the performance of 
the job. The mechanic's job has always required the incumbent to 
assist "in a variety of other building and grounds maintenance 
tasks" and to perform "related work as required".-7 The City is 
currently requiring the mechanic to haul to a landfill, 
approximately once per week, the silt and sand which are washed 
down through screens in the system and collected in the dump 
truck. Our decision is limited to this factual context. We make. 
-
7The City and CSEA dispute whether some driving done by the 
mechanic in the past was pursuant to a required assignment or was 
undertaken voluntarily by the employee. The Assistant Director 
did not resolve this dispute and we need not either, given the 
basis for our decision. Even if the prior driving was voluntary, 
the particular driving task in issue in this case is within the 
scope of this position. 
Board - U-16561 -5 
no decision as to whether driving of a different type, or for 
other purposes, or of the same type with significantly greater 
frequency, would be tasks incidentally related to the mechanic's 
job. We consider the driving being required of the mechanic to 
be a task incidentally related to the performance of his job 
because it is ancillary to the performance of the distinguishing 
features of the position and its typical work activities whether 
under the old or new job description. The silt and sand are by-
products of the water treatment process, released automatically 
or pursuant to cleaning tasks for which the mechanic is clearly 
responsible. This type of driving is sufficiently "related" to 
the miscellaneous maintenance and repair duties of the mechanic 
as to fall within the mechanic's existing and former job 
description. As such, the driving assignment is not mandatorily 
negotiable. The licensing requirement is similarly nonmandatory 
under State of New York. As neither the driving nor licensing 
requirements are mandatorily negotiable, it is not necessary for 
us to reach the merits of the City's defenses grounded upon 
alleged contract rights. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
denied and the Assistant Director's dismissal of the charge is 
affirmed. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
4d ^VcJ 
Paulins-fR. Kinsella, Chairperson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OP UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4493 
SHOREHAM-WADING RIVER PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
RONALD CLEARY, for Petitioner 
FRANK & BRESLOW, LLP (ALLEN B. BRESLOW of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 4, 1995, the United Public Service Employees 
Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers District 
Council 424 (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely 
petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of 
certain employees of the Shoreham-Wading River Public Library 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating unit was 
appropriate: 
Included: Clerk Typist, Library Clerks, Senior Library 
Clerks, Principal Library Clerks, Account 
Clerks, Senior Account Clerks. 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4493 
SHOREHAM-WADING RIVER PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
RONALD CLEARY, for Petitioner 
FRANK & BRESLOW, LLP (ALLEN B. BRESLOW of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 4, 1995, the United Public Service Employees 
Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers District 
Council 424 (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely 
petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of 
certain employees of the Shoreham-Wading River Public Library 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating unit was 
appropriate: 
Included: Clerk Typist, Library Clerks, Senior Library 
Clerks, Principal Library Clerks, Account 
Clerks, Senior Account Clerks. 
Case No. C-4493 2 -
Excluded: All other employees, and those confidential 
employees as set forth on attached page.-7 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held on March 13, 1996, at which seven ballots were cast in favor 
of representation by the petitioner and seven ballots were cast 
against representation by the petitioner.-1 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition 
should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
r 
-\PN8f/ J^. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric/j. Schmertz, Member 
-' The reference was to an attachment to the parties7 consent 
agreement. 
-' There are 14 employees in the stipulated unit. 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNCIL 82, APSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12374 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenors. 
CHRISTOPHER H. GARDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. MCDOWELL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Intervenor Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEFFREY G. PLANT of 
counsel), for Intervenor Public Employees Federation, AFL-
CIO 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
We issued a decision and order in this case on September 30, 
1994.ix council 82, AFSCME, AFL-GIO has moved to modify the 
remedial order entered in that case because it omits reference to 
the "Move/Control PMS post at Marcy". All parties have either 
^27 PERB f3055 (1994)(appeal pending). 
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COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
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STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenors. 
CHRISTOPHER H. GARDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. MCDOWELL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Intervenor Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEFFREY G. PLANT of 
counsel), for Intervenor Public Employees Federation, AFL-
CIO 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
We issued a decision and order in this case on September 30, 
1994.-' Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has moved to modify the 
remedial order entered in that case because it omits reference to 
the "Move/Control PMS post at Marcy". All parties have either 
1727 PERB f3055 (1994) (appeal pending). 
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consented to modification as requested or have no objection to 
it. 
Our omission of a reference to this post was unintentional 
as we affirmed the finding of violation made in this respect by 
the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation. Therefore, we grant Council 82's motion and, 
accordingly, hereby modify paragraph 1 of our order dated 
September 30, 1994 to provide as follows: 
1. Forthwith reinstate ... the Move/Control PMS posts at 
Marcy, Mid-State, Oneida and Mohawk, .... 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
ZhAjn if i-s 
Pauline* R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY EDUCATION SUPPORT 
STAFF ASSOCIATION NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4470 
SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Susquehanna Valley Education 
Support Staff Association, NEA/NY has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
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In the Matter of 
SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY EDUCATION SUPPORT 
STAFF ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4470 
SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
• IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Susquehanna Valley Education 
Support Staff Association, NEA/NY has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
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below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-time 
noninstructional employees in the classified 
civil service. 
Excluded: Transportation Supervisor, Director of 
Facilities, Buildings and Grounds, School 
Wellness Coordinator, School Business 
Executive, Computer Coordinator, Computer 
Technician, Secretary to the Superintendent, 
Secretary to the Assistant Superintendent. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Susquehanna Valley 
Education Support Staff Association, NEA/NY. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4498 
CITY OF COHOES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time public safety dispatchers. 
) 
.y 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4498 
CITY OF COHOES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time public safety dispatchers. 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
^ j).: -r L4L 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J/ Schmertz, Member 
i 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMHERST PARAPROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4501 
AMHERST CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Amherst Paraprofessional 
Association, NYSUT has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Teacher Aide, School Monitor, TV Technician and 
TV Technician Helper. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMHERST PARAPROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4501 
AMHERST CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Amherst Paraprofessional 
Association, NYSUT has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Teacher Aide, School Monitor, TV Technician and 
TV Technician Helper. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Amherst Paraprofessional 
Association, NYSUT. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 27, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Eric 
